The World Bank’s April 2026 Africa Economic Update carries a warning that cuts against most of the continent’s recent progress: the combination of Brent crude near $100, the US naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, rising food prices, and tightening external financial conditions is likely to reverse significant portions of the disinflation that sub-Saharan African central banks have spent the last two years engineering.
What the report says
The update projects that sub-Saharan Africa’s headline inflation — which fell from a regional average of 18 percent in 2022 to about 5 percent in early 2026 — could rebound by 1 to 2 percentage points by year-end if the Hormuz blockade persists beyond the second quarter. The report identifies three transmission channels: direct fuel pass-through, food prices (both imported staples and fertiliser-dependent domestic production), and currency pressure as risk-off global capital flows pull dollars out of frontier markets.
The countries most exposed
Countries that import a high share of refined petroleum are the first to feel it. Ghana imports around 95 percent of its refined fuel. Kenya imports essentially all of it. Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Ethiopia all sit in the same structural position. These are also — not coincidentally — the economies that have been most loudly celebrated over the past year for bringing inflation back into target bands. The Bank of Ghana’s March 2026 rate cut to 14 percent, for instance, is now directly at risk of being reversed if pump prices rise for two consecutive months.
The fertiliser dimension
The less-discussed risk is fertiliser. Russia and Belarus remain the continent’s largest potash suppliers, and Gulf-routed urea shipments transit the same choke points now under stress. If the 2026 planting season opens with fertiliser prices 30-40 percent above 2025 levels — a scenario the World Bank treats as a base case if Hormuz remains closed — African food inflation in late 2026 becomes a harvest problem, not just a price problem.
What governments can actually do
The policy tools are limited. Most African central banks do not have the reserves to defend their currencies against a sustained external shock, and most finance ministries do not have the fiscal space to absorb subsidy bills the size that would be needed to insulate consumers. The World Bank’s recommendation — accelerated regional trade integration through AfCFTA to substitute intra-African trade for imports — is sound on paper and very slow in practice.
The hard-won disinflation of the last two years was real. It was also, it turns out, fragile.
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